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ABSTRACT.
 
The-current baseline method.and software implementation of the
 
Space Shuttle -reaction control subsystem failure detection and identifi­
cation (RCS FDI) system is presented. This algorithm is recommended
 
for inclusion in the redundancy management (RM) module of the Space
 
Shuttle Guidance, Navigation and Control System. Supporting software
 
is presented, and recommended for inclusion in the system management
 
(SM) and display and control (D&C) systems.
 
RCS FDI uses data from sensors in the jets, in the manifold iso­
lation valves, and in the RCS fuel and oxidizer storage tanks. A list
 
of jet failures and fuel imbalance warnings is generated for use by
 
the jet selection algorithm of the on-orbit and entry flight control
 
systems, and to inform the crew and ground controllers of RCS failure
 
status. Manifold isolation valve close commands are generated in the
 
event of failed on or leaking jets to prevent loss of large quantities
 
of RCS fuel.
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FOREWORD
 
The system description is as complete and detailed as current
 
development allows.
 
Reference 1 presents rationales for the design, a description
 
of hardware sensor devices, and descriptions of nominal operation of
 
RCS FDI.
 
Section 1 of this report describes the functional requirements
 
of the method. It contains a statement of the objective of RCS FDI,
 
a list of assumptions governing design of the algorithm, the input­
output requirements, and a brief functional description of the software.
 
Section 2 presents the software formulation of RCS FDI. First,
 
a modelfexecutive for FDI is given, followed by the eight functional
 
modules of RCS FDI. An assessment is made of core and timing require­
ments.
 
Section 3 contains a glossary of variable names in the software.
 
Supporting data is included in the appendices.
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SECTION 1
 
SOFTWARE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
 
1.1 Overview
 
The Flight Control (FC) module controls the attitude and trans­
lation of the space shuttle orbiter during the on-orbit mission phase
 
and early in the entry phase by utilizing as effectors the Reaction
 
Control Subsystem (RCS) and/or thrust vector control of the Orbital
 
Maneuvering System (OMS).
 
In a normal RCS jet firing, the following sequence and delays
 
can be expected:
 
(1) Turn on
 
(a) Issuance of on command by Jet Select.
 
(b) Transport to driver - TBD milliseconds. 
(c) Opening of solenoids - < 10 milliseconds. 
(d) Thrust buildup to steady state - r20 milliseconds.
 
(e) Steady-state thrust.
 
(2) Turn off
 
(a) Issuance of off command by Jet Select.
 
(b) Transport to RCS driver - TBD milliseconds.
 
(c) Closure of ,solenoid valves - < 10 milliseconds.
 
(d) Thrust tailoff to zero - 'v20 milliseconds.
 
Several possibilites exist for anomalous behavior in either of
 
these sequences leading up to failure. These include:
 
(1) Communication failures.
 
(2) Solenoid failures both opening, closing.
 
(3) Failure to achieve normal chamber pressure.
 
(4) Leakage.
 
Based on these considerations, failure types are broken up into two
 
groupings, on failures and off failures. Although several subgroupings
 
of these by cause exist, there are but two major types of FDI response;
 
one for all on failures and another for all off failures.
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An on failure occurs any time a jet is producing thrust or
 
consuming propellant when not commanded or leaking. Since, in the
 
strictest sense, this would include normal thrust tailoff, an on
 
failure condition must consistently exist for a minimum period of time
 
longer than that of normal thrust tailoff. On failures, then, may
 
include failure of solenoids to close in response to off commands,
 
excessively long tailoffs, or leaks. The current algorithm identifies
 
on failures within 3 seconds.
 
Off failures are defined as a failure of an RCS thruster to
 
develop thrust in response to an on command from the Jet Select. This
 
could result from communication faults, accidental closure of isolation
 
valves, jamming of either or both of the solenoids in the closed
 
position, or a thruster structural failure. This current method
 
detects off failures and identifies the failed jet in 120 milliseconds.
 
Nominal chamber-pressure and chamber-temperature histories have
 
been obtained for the RCS jets in vacuum conditions. Changes in these
 
conditions due to atmospheric effects during entry have not yet been
 
determined, so that some parameter modifications in the FDI algorithm
 
may be necessary.
 
The RCS EDI module will be contained primarily in the RM module,
 
with interacting modules in the SM and D&C modules. Figure 1 shows
 
the relationship of these modules to other GN&C major modules, and to
 
sensors, effectors, controls, and displays.
 
These modules are scheduled by the Moding, Sequencing, and Control
 
(MSC) software via the Flight Computer Operating System (FCOSY.
 
RCS FDI is accomplished by two procedures in P1, with monitoring
 
of manifold isolation valve positions, fuel/oxidizer ratios in the RCS
 
tanks, and RCS command and feedback data path failures performed by
 
three modules within SM, and crew interaction handled with two modules
 
in D&C.
 
It is inaccurate, at this time, to refer to the RCS FDI executive
 
as a module, as it is merely a conceptual model of the scheduling of
 
the various RCS FDI modules. In fact, this scheduling will be
 
accomplished by executives for the RM, SM, and D&C modules. However,
 
it is presented here, as design requirements of RCS FDI dictate certain
 
constraints on these executives, which are embodied in the RCS FDI
 
executive.
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Figure 2. Interaction of FDI with other modules and hardware.
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1.2 RCS FDI Executive
 
The RCS FDI executive, as herein described, is a model for segments
 
of the RM, SM, and D&C executives which will schedule RCS FDI. It is
 
not intended that this be a specific software module, and it must be
 
emphasized that it is presented for engineering purposes only. Actual
 
implementation of software to schedule the various RCS FD1 modules will
 
be accomplished -as part of the design of the RM, SM, and D&C executives.
 
In each minor cycle (andmajor cycle, as major cycles will coin­
cide with each 25th minor cycle), the executive calls MONITORBTUMASK,
 
OFFAIL, and MANIFOLD CHECK. OFFAIL is scheduled on a minor cycle
 
basis because it is quite fast, and such scheduling enables the most rapid
 
possible detection of off failed RCS jets. MANIFOLD CHECK is scheduled
 
each minor cycle to meet the requirement that no RCS jet on a given
 
manifold be fired 80 milliseconds after the closure of that manifold's
 
isolation valves. Because of an uncertain lag in valve closure, and
 
because the GPC has no other way of sensing manual manifold closure
 
checks, MANIFOLD CHECK cannot predict the closure times, and must
 
therefore be executed each minor cycle. Running MONITOR BTU MASK
 
each minor cycle prevents the other procedures run each minor cycle
 
from acting on erroneous data by disabling them within a minor cycle
 
of detecting a communication failure.
 
STOREFDIINIT_DATA, OVERRIDEUPDATE, ONFAIL, and FUELIMBALANCE
 
are each run no more frequently than every major cycle to minimize
 
computer burden.
 
The tradeoff is that STORE FDIINIT DATA provides initialization
 
data which may be as stale as one major cycle, manual interactions with
 
RCS FDI will take one major cycle to be implemented, and on failures
 
of RCS jets will exist for two major cycles before detection. It is
 
held that the first two penalties are readily ignored, and that the
 
cost of running ONFAIL each major cycle (rather than each minor cycle)
 
will be an acceptably small loss of RCS propellant.
 
Since the rate of depletion of the RCS propellant tanks is so
 
small during normal RCS activity or leaks, FUEL IMBALANCE can safely
 
be run each major cycle, and it may be safe to execute it at a lower
 
frequency if timing considerations so dictate.
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In the presence of a communication fault, the FDI executive
 
inhibits STORE_ FDI INITDATA to maintain the initialization data
 
stored on the last major cycle before the communication failure. The
 
executive also inhibits OVERRIDE-UPDATE except on those major cycles
 
when the D&C SOP indicates a new override, inhibit, or enable command
 
has been keyed in. The procedure RECHECK ONFAILS is only scheduled
 
when ONFAIL indicates a jet is newly on failed and requires checking.
 
1.3 	 RCS FDI
 
1.3.1 	Objective
 
The RCS FDI detects and identifies RCS failures and off-nominal
 
performance, and takes appropriate action. This action consists of
 
sending a list of failed jets to the RCS jet selection algorithm,
 
closing manifold isolation valves where a leak is detected, and
 
informing the crew and ground controllers of RCS performance.
 
1.3.2 	Assumptions
 
The following assumptions are made about inputs to RCS FDI:
 
(1) 	 Driver talkbacks, jet commands, chamber-pressure talk­
backs, and manifold isolation valve commands and talkbacks
 
will be packed discretes channelized as in Appendix A
 
and available to FDI in the concatenated form shown in
 
Appendix A.
 
(2) RCS leak detector talkbacks will be available in 16-bit
 
fixed-point format as in Appendix B, and can be treated
 
as bit strings, i.e., operated upon by logical AND.
 
(3) 	 Inputs from D&C will be packed as described in Appendix A,
 
and preceded by appropriate flags (Section 2.3.3).
 
The following assumotions are made about RCS FDI output:
 
(1) 	 Jet fail lists will be produced in packed form, bit
 
assignments jet by jet being as those for jet commands.
 
(2) 	 Manifold isolation valve commands are packed as in
 
Appendix A.
 
(3) 	 Interfacing software will be developed to reformat RCS FDI*
 
data for crew display and telemetry.
 
It is further assumed that the sensors and actuators used by
 
RCS FDI are completely reliable, pending further study.
 
This software may be included in a later revision of this document.
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1.3.3 	Input/Output Requirements
 
Table 1 lists the interface requirements for RCS FDI.
 
1.3.3.1 	Inputs
 
Inputs to RCS FDI are:
 
(1) 	 Copies of packed RCS jet commands concatenated as in
 
Reference 2.
 
(2) 	 Packed chamber pressure discretes.
 
(3) 	 Packed driver talkback discretes.
 
(4) 	 Packed isolation manifold discretes.
 
(5) 	 Packed manual overrides, inhibits, enables.
 
(6) 	 RCS fuel and oxidizer tank quantities.
 
1.3.3.2 	Outputs
 
Outputs of RCS FDI are:
 
(1) 	 Jet fail lists packed the same way as the input jet
 
commands.
 
(2) 	 Manifold isolation valve automatic close commands.
 
(3) 	 Fuel imbalance warning flags.
 
1.3.4 	Functional Description
 
The RCS FDI algorithm compares packed discretes representing
 
jet commands, jet chamber pressures and jet driver talkbacks, and
 
integers representing jet fuel injector and jet oxidizer injector
 
temperature, to arrive at a list of failed jets. In the event of leaks,
 
it can automatically close manifold isolation valves to prevent the
 
loss of fuel and oxidizer.
 
1.3.4.1 	MONITOR BTU MASK
 
MONITORBTUMASK checks eight discretes which indicate failure
 
status of critical cards in the MDM used to control the RCS jets.
 
When one of these discretes goes on, MONITOR BTU MASK inhibits the Jet
 
Select from using the jets commanded via that data path, and issues
 
a close command to the manifold controlled via that card. The state
 
of RCS FDI at the last major cycle before the failure is kept for use
 
in reinitializing FDI after the data path failure. When the flags are
 
all down, reinitialization of RCS FDI using that data is commanded by
 
MONITOR BTU MASK.
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Table 1. 

SOURCE
COMPUTER SOREVLEOR 
NAME 
DESTINATION 

INPUTS
 
JETCOMA JET SELECT 

JETCOMB 
JETCOMC
 
JETCOMD
 
MANUAL OVER-

RIDE A D&C 

MANUAL OVER-

RIDE
 
MANUAL OVER-

RIDEC
 
MANUAL OVER-

RIDED
 
INHIBIT A D&C 

INHIBITB 

INHIBITC 
INHIBITD
 
AUT OVER- D&C 

RIDE A 

AUT OVER-

RIDE B
 
AUT OVER-

RIDE C
 
AUT OVER-

RIDED
 
CHANGE D&C 

OVERRIDE 

STATUS 

IVOA, IVOB Hardware* 

IVOC, IVOD 

FLEAK Hardware* 

OLEAK Hardware* 

DRIVERA Hardware* 

DRIVERB
 
DRIVERC 
DRIVERD
 
PRESSA Hardware* 

PRESSB 

PRESSC
 
PRESSD
 
RCS FDI interface requirements. 
DESCRIPTION UNITS 
VALUE 
OR 
RANGE 
SAMPLERAME 
RATE (Hz) 
RCS jet commands (packed) - ON/OFF 25 
Request flags to reenable but 
inhibit further FDI on certain 
RCS jets (packed) 
- ON/OFF 1 
Request flags to disable certain 
RCS 3ets (packed) 
ON/OFF 
Request flags to reenable and 
continue FDI on certain RCS jets 
(packed) 
ON/OFF 
Flag indicating new crew requests 
to override, inhibit, or reenable 
certain jets 
Manifold isolation valve OPEN 
talkbacks 
RCS fuel leak detector outputs 
RCS oxidizer leak detector outputs 
RCS jet driver talkbacks (packed) 
-
-
OF 
0 F 
ON/OFF 
ON/OFF 
TBD 
TBD 
ON/OFF 
25 
1 
1 
I 
RCS chamber pressure sensor 
talkbacks (packed) 
ON/OFF 25 
*Pending design of TOPS
 
8 
Table 1. RCS FDI interface requirements (Cont.)
 
C SOURCE
COMPUTER OR 
NAME DESTINATION 

MINORCYCLE MS&C 

MAJOR-CYCLE MS&C 

OXYQUANTITY RCS SM' 

FUEL_QUANTITY RCS SM 

BTU FF01 13 FCOS 

BTU FF01 05 

aTtJFF02 13
 
BTT FF02 05 
BTU FAO i0
 
BTUFA01702
 
BTU FA03 10'
 
BTUFA03_02
 
INIT OVER- MS&C, 

RIDEUPDATE MONITOR 

BTU MAST 
XNITOFFAIL 

INIT 0NFA1L 
OUTPUTS
 
MANCOMA Hardware* 

MANCOMB
 
MANCOMC
 
MANCOMD
 
JFAILA Jet Select 

JFAILB
 
JFAILC
 
JFATLD
 
MINSQUANTITY CRT SOP 

FUEL- CRT SOP 

IMBALANCE 

FLAG 

*Pending design of IOPs.
 
DESCRIPTION 

Flag indicating minor cycle 

Flag indicating major cycle 

RCS oxidizer quantity remaining 

in tanks each module
 
RCS fuel quantity remaining in, 

tanks each module
 
Flags indicating failure of 

various MDM data paths
 
Initialization flag for override 

update
 
Initialization flag for OFFAIL 

Initialization flag for ONFAIL 

Automatic manifold close commands 

RCS jet failure list 

Lesser of' fuel, oxidizer 

quantities each RCS module
 
Flag indicating fuel/oxidizer 

ratio out of spec each RCS
 
module
 
VALUE
 
UNITS OR SAMPLE 
RANGE RATE (Hz)
 
P,ON/OFF 25 
- ON/OFF 25 
Percent 0-109 1 
Percent 0-109 1 
ON/OFF 25
 
- ON/OFF 1 
- ON/OFF 25 
- ON/OFF 1 
- ON/OFF 1 
ON/OFF 25
 
Percent 0-109 1 
ON/OFF 1 
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1.3.4.2 STOREFDIINIT DATA
 
STORE FDI INIT DATA snapshots the failure list, the overrides
 
from crew input, and the automatic manifold isolation valve close
 
commands each major cycle, for use in reinitializing RCS FDI after an
 
MDM card failure. Since it is inhibited in the presence of the failure,
 
the data it provides for reinitialization will not reflect any errors
 
in RCS FDI due to data errors caused by the failure.
 
1.3.4.3 OVERRIDE-UPDATE
 
OVERRIDE_-UPDATE receives crew requests to inhibit, reenable, and
 
manually override RCS fail status. It ensures that mutually exclusive
 
requests are not implemented, and builds a list of which jets are to be
 
added to the fail list, and which are to be deleted due to crew requests.
 
1.3.4.4 OFFAIL
 
OFFAIL detects failures of jets to fire in response to on commands
 
from the jet selection software. It compares these on commands with
 
chamber pressure discretes generated by pressure sensors and level
 
detection equipment in the hardware. When a jet is commanded on but
 
.shows no chamber pressure for three consecutive minor cycles, OFFAIL
 
adds it to the fail list, unless it is manually overridden by the crew.
 
1.2.4.5 ONFAIL
 
ONFAIL detects leaks in RCS jets, and jet firings occurring in
 
the absence of jet on commands (i.e., failures to shut off). ONFAIL
 
first compares the temperature of the fuel and oxidizer injectors with
 
a 300F threshold. If either temperature is below this valve, or if
 
the driver talkback is on and the jet command is off, for two consecutive
 
major cycles, ONFAIL adds the jet to the fail list, and flags it for
 
recheck.
 
1.3.4.6 RECHECONFAILS
 
One major cycle after ONFAIL flags jets, they are checked for
 
driver on talkbacks or leaks by RECHECK ONFAILS. If those jets
 
continue to show leaks or drivers on, RECHECK ONFAILS issues a comuand
 
to close the isolation valve on the manifold feeding fuel and oxidizer
 
to those jets.
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1.3.4.7 MANIFOLD-CHECK
 
MANIFOLDCHECK examines the manifold isolation valve open talk­
backs each minor cycle. If one such talkback was on (open) but goes
 
off indicating partial or total closure of the valve, MANIFOLDCHECK
 
copies the failure status of the jets on that manifold, then adds all
 
the jets on that-manifold to-the fail list. If one such talkback
 
goes from off- (closed) to on, MANIFOLD CHECK deletes from the fail
 
list those jets on the manifold that were not failed prior to manifold
 
closure.
 
1.3.4.8 FUELzIMBALANCE
 
'FUEL-IMBALANCE checks the-percentage of fuel and oxidizer remaining
 
in the tanks of each of three RCS modules. -If the difference between
 
the fuel percentage remaining and the oxidizer percentage remaining
 
exceeds 1.6, FUELIMBALANCE sets a warning flag for that RCS module
 
which is displayed to the crew.. The procedure then picks the lesser of
 
fuel or oxidizer in each module andprovides it as the critical quantity
 
to the crew display.
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SECTION 2
 
SOFTWARE FORMULATION
 
2.1 RCS FDI EXECUTIVE (see automatic flowchart)
 
The software herein described is only a working model for soft­
ware in the RM, SM, and D&C executives and is only presented as a con­
ceptual model.
 
The PDI EXECUTIVE will either be executed each minor cycle, or will
 
check a flag which will trigger it each minor cycle. The latter is
 
implemented for generality. On a minor cycle, the FDI EXECUTIVE calls
 
MONITOR BTU MASK, OFFAIL, and MANIFOLDCHECK. A flag indicating a
 
major cycle is next checked. On a major cycle, STORE FDI INIT DATA
 
and OVERRIDE UPDATE are called, subject to conditions described in
 
Section 1.2. FUEL.IMBALANCE is called every major cycle.
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SFD EXC:
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* - ~~~~~THEN* ,************ 
IF MINCE CYCLE = ON --------------- CALL MONITOR 1T2 MASK; 
*CALL OVEAL;
 
* CALL MANIFOLDCHECK; 
* * ~~~~THEN'6 ****t**~**6*********~ 
IF NAJOR_CYCLE - ON *-...........---------- - .­
**IF (CALL-N OR INIT THEN*OI OVERIEUPDATE 
* *-------------------* CALL STORE_ ?DI-_ NITIDATA:* 
*OR EMIT OFFAIL ORtINITONFALL) = OFF * 

19 JANUARY 21,1976. 22:40:31.56. 
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CALL CVEiRIDE_UPDATE;
 
Hn
 
2.2 RCS FDI
 
2.2.1 MONITORBTU-MASK (see automatic flowchart)
 
MONITOR BTU MASK checks eight flags called BTU MASKs, which indi­
cate failures in the hardware communication paths between the GPC and
 
the RCS hardware. Each flag corresponds to an MDM, and if it is on,
 
is assumed to indicate failure of all data paths on that MDM.
 
When a BTU MASK goes on, the procedure adds the jets commanded
 
through that MDM to the fail list, and issues a close command to the
 
manifold isolation valve controlled through that MDM. The temporary
 
flag CALL -INIT is set on. MONITORBTUMASK then checks CALL INIT.
 
If it is on, the procedure checks the eight BTU MASKs. When all
 
eight are again off, the procedure sets initialization flags for
 
OVERRIDE-UPDATE, ONFAIL, and OFFAIL, and sets CALLINIT off.
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I CICSES A MANIFOLD AND JEIS ON MDM INDICATING COMM FAULT
 
I CHANNELIZATION ASSUMED WILL HAVE TC CHECK
 
* - * ~~~~~THEN********************* 
* 	 IF BTUFF01 13 = ON *---------------*
 
* * HANCCIIA = MANCOMA OR MAPMANCOMA OR *
 
* 	 1:* * 
* MAPEANCOMA 	 * 
* , 2:* 	 * 
* .o,* 
* JFAILA = JFAILA OR BIN(16) 1 I BIN( * 
* 16) '0'; 	 * 
* CALLINIT = ON; 	 * 
O
 
HHE
 
*. * THEN *****€***************************€******
 
* I ETU-FF01 05 ON * -------------- * 	 * 
* 	 * * MANCGA = MANCOMA OR MAPMANCOMA OR * 
* 3:1'* 
* * 
* MAP -ANCOMA ; 	 * 
* 8:* * 
* ,- . * 
* JFAILA = JFAILA Ot BIN(16}0' |1 BIN( * 
*.16) 1'; 	 * 
* CALL INIT = ON; 	 * 
22 C. 5. DRAER LABORATORY AUTOMATIC JLOHCHABT OF PROCEDURE OMITOR_BET_ MASK JANUARY 21.1976. 22:40. 31.56. 

* 
IF LTU_E02 13 ON * ------
* * 
--
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* 
= 
. 
MANCOMB O AP 
. 
MANCOMB OR * 
1:* 
MAP_MANCOMB
* 
; 
** 
JFAhlE 
*6 4 
= JFAILB OR BIN(16)'1 ii BTN( * 
4 
* CAL_ INIT = ON; * 
* -
IF* P2U-FO2OS= OF 
S* 
* 
--------­
~~~~~THEN********************* 
* IMANCCIB = 
* 
MANCOMH OR MAP MANCOCMB OR 
** 
1 MAP MANCOMB ; 
I 4:* 
* 
H TEU 01I 
4 
* * . 
* JFAn!! 
16)11; 
= 
.. 
JFA1LII OR BIN(16]'O' BIN(* 
I * CALIL.EIT =ON; 
*IF 
* -
E7C FA0i 
* 
10 ON 
* 
** 
----------
~~~~~THEN********************* 
= . 
IANCCNC MANCOMC OR HAPIIANCOMC OR* 
* AP-0ANCOMC ; 
* 2:* 
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JFAILC = JFAILC OR BIN(1b)'' ii BIN(
 
* 1)'0 ; 
* CALLINIT = O; * 
THEN************************************ 
* EF = *---------------* o . *TU-EA01_02 ON 
* * * MANCCMC = MANCOMC OR MAPIANCOC OR * 
* 3:* 
* AP MANCOMC * 
* 4:* 
16) - 1. 
CALLINIT ON; * 
** MANCCMD = ANCOMD OR r.AP-MANCOKID OR
 
I *
 
*CALL INIT = ON; *
 
MAP_MANCOMD
 
~2:*
 
JFAItD = JAILD OR BN(16)'10' II BIN( 
4 16)1'; * = 
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* - ~~~~~THEN* *****~*************** 
* 
IF ETNUEA0302 = ON *--
* 
* 
* 
---
NANCCtD 
* 
= 
* 
MANCOMD OR MAP MANCOMD ON * 
3:* * 
j * 
MAP_ANCOfLD 
4:* 
* 
*EALt 
16)1'1 
OJFAILD OR BIN(16)0' I BIN( * 
CALL INIT = ON; * 
*IF CALL INII ON 
ZHE 
*---------------
* * IF (BTU_FF01_13 OR BTU_FFO105O BTU-FF02-13 
o _ O -_ O _ _O* 
OR BTU FF02 05 OR BTUFAO110 OR OTU FA002 
* 
* 
. . ..THEN 
*---------------
**** 
25* 
*OR HBTUFA03_ 10 OR BTllTAOS 02) =OFF 
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* 25 * 
* INfl CVERIDIE UPDATE CN;
 
* INI ONFAII = ON; *
 
* INII_CFFAIL = ON; *
 
* CALL NIT = OFF; *
 
**** *** ** **** 
I' 
2.2.2 STOREFDI-TNITDATA (see automatic flowchart)
 
STORE FDI INITDATA maintains a record of the jet failure list,
 
the overrides, and the automatic manifold isolation valve close commands.
 
Each time 'it is called, the procedure copies these items into separate
 
storage locations, used only for initialization of the RCS FDI soft­
ware.
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STOLLEC
PCI _IIT DATA:
 
'I F L 
fCI CE LUHE
i 
it tielil IR'ti ite itil i lait 11111 iii lilt 1it111 
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TO E.CALLED ONCE PER MAJC CYCLE
 
* 	 GOC£ JFAILA = JEAILA; * 
* . - *
 
* GOCDJFAILB = JFAILB; *
 
GOCD JFAILC = JFAILC; * 
* 	 * 
* GOCD_JEAILD = JFAILD; * 
M I 
U, 
* 	 GCCEC- OVISRIDEA = FF_ CVERhIDEA; * 
GOCD CFR OVERRIDEB = CFF CV!RhIDE E; 
GOODOFF OVERRIDEC = CEF_CVEREIDE C; 
GOCD CE? OVERRIDED = O_ CVEAIDEE;, * 
* 	 * 
* GCCL-CN-OVERRIDEA ON OVERRIDE A; * 
* GOCO C CVERRIDEB = CNOVERRIDEB; * 
* GOODON CVEERIDE C = CN_OVHRIEE C; * 
* 	 = 
*GOOD ON OVR RIDED = CliOVRRIDEDD 
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i 
* GOCDNANCOBA = MANCOfA; 
* GOOD MANCOHE = MANCOmE; 
* 
* 
* GOCD-XANCOIC 
. 
*GOOD 1 ANCOME 
= 
= 
MANCOMC; 
MANCOMD; 
* 
* 
N)
0­
2.2.3 OVERRIDE-UPDATE (see automatic flowchart)
 
This procedure implements crew inputs to inhibit, override, and
 
reenable RCS jets.
 
Initialization of this procedure consists of replacing the current
 
override lists with copies of the lists provided by STOREFDIINITDATA.
 
Each time it is called, the procedure generates the lists ON OVER-
RIDE and OFF-OVERRIDE for use by other RCS FDI software, and modifies 
the fail list to include temporary enables. ONOVERRIDE _A, _B, _C', 
and _D are updated by ORing QN_OVERRIDE with the requests to reenable 
jets (NEW ON OVERRIDE) regardless of FDI, then ANDing the result with 
the complement of the inhibit requests (NEW OFF OVERRIDE), thus including 
the new requests to reenable jets, and preventing a conflict with the 
new requests to inhibit jets. 
Similarly, OFF OVERRIDE A, _B, _C, and _D are updated by ORing
 
OFF-OVERRIDE with the requests to inhibit jets, then ANDing the result
 
with the complement of requests to reenable jets, thus including new
 
inhibits, and preventing conflicts with new reenables.
 
JFAIL is then modified to incorporate requests to reenable jets,
 
while still performing FDI on them. This is done by ORing JFAIL with
 
these requests (TEMPON OVERRIDE).
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CVEdILEUPLATE:
 
"RCCELURE;
 
eu 5 
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* 	 * ***************~*****~~~~~~~~~~THEN 
IF IbIT OVERRIDE UPDATE = ON --------- * -­
* * ON OVERRIDE-A = GOOD-ON-OVERRIDE A;, 
ONOVERRIDEB = GOODONOVERRIDE B; 
ON OVERRIDEC = GOOD-ONOVERRIDEC; 
* 	 ON OVERRIDE_ =.GOODONOVERRIDE_D; 
OFF OvERRIDEA = GOOD OFF CVERRIDE A; 
OFF OVERRIDEB = GOODOFF_OVERRIDEB; 
OFFOVERRIDEC = GOOD OFF OCERRIDEC; 

OFFOVERRIDED = GOODOFFOVERIDED;
 
* 	 ENITOVERRIDEUPDATE = OFF: 
CN 	CVERRIDE A ONOVERRIDE A Ch MANUAL OVERRIDE A 
* 	 AND (NOT INHIEIT A); * 
• CNCVERRIDEB = ONCVE;RIDE B CE MANUAL OVERBIDE B * 
* AND (NO INHIBITB); * 
SON CVERRIDEC = ON OVERRIDE C hbMANUAL CVERRIDE C * 
* AND (NOT INHIBITC) ; * 
21,1976. 22:40:31.56. 
*
 
* 
* 
* 
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* CN CVERRIDE_t = ON_OVENIDE_ Cb hANUALOVERAIDED 
AND (NCI INHIBIT-D); 

* CFFOVEhRIDEA = OFF CVEdRILE A OR 
AND (NCT MANUAL OVERRIDEA); 
*CFFOVESRILE3B = OFF CVlRhILE-E Ch 
* AND (NOT MANUALOVLRbILZ_B); 
* OFF OVERRIDEC = OFFCVEHRIDEC OR 
0 4AND (NOT MANUAZ_ OV;ERIDE C) • 
* 
INHIBIT A * 
* 
INHIBITS * 
* 
INHIEITC * 
* CFFOVErRILED = OFF CVzahtIEL CH IIRIBITO * 
AND (NOT MANUAL OVERSIDE D);
 
JFAILA = JFAILA AND (NOI Aol CVlRRIDEA); * 
* JFAILB = JEAILB AND (NOT AU! CVirRIDE_B); * 
* JFAILC = JEAILC AND (NOT AUI CVEBRIDE C); * 
* * 
* JFAILD = JEAILD ANib (NOT AU7 CVERRIDE D); * 
* CHAhGE CVERRIDE STATUS = OFF; * 
2.2.4 OFFAIL (see automatic flowchart)
 
OFFAIL detects failures of jets to fire in response to "ON" com­
mands from the GPC.
 
Upon initialization, OFFAIL replaces the jet fail list with the
 
fail list stored by STORE FDI INITDATA, and zeroes the first slot in
 
its pushdown list.
 
Each time it is called, OFFAIL first advances its three-level
 
pushdown lists OFA, OFB, OFC, and OFD. That is, the jets in the second
 
slot are moved into the third slot, and those in the first slot are
 
moved into the second. OFFAIL then moves into the first slot those
 
jets which are commanded on but whose pressure transducer talkbacks
 
are off. OFFAIL adds to the jet fail list those *Jets-twhich appear in
 
all three slots by ORing those three si'os.w-ith te fail list. Finally,
 
OFFAIL implements the reenable command 'by ANDing the jet fail list with
 
the complement of ON OVERRIDE.
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OFFAIL: 
rPRCCELURE;
I' nl II If pg II p. p,Ip II pp Pt pp pp 
.1. 
I AY WAbT TO CALL OThER MINCL CYCLE STUFF 
SAVE COHEAULT CHELKING 
FROM HERE TO 
*IF 
* 
* -
flTl OFFAIL =ON 
*THEN 
*------------------
* 
**********4**** 
* JFAIIA = GOOD JFAILA; 4 
0 
I * JFAIIB = GOODJFAILB;* 
J* * 
|" * JFAIIC = GOODJFAILC; 
JFAiLD = GOODJFAILD *
 
OFB1 = BIN(32)10'; * 
*OFCI = I1 N(32)0' 
OFDI = BIN(32)I0t; * 
I*IF OFFAI=OFL ; * 
* * 
= CFA2= *FA3 N )
 
* = C
 
**
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* GFC3 = CFC2; * 
* OFD3 = CFD2; * 
* CFA2 = CFA1; * 
* GF2=CB;*
 
* CFH2 CFB1; *
 
* CFC2 = CFC1; * 
* CFDI;* *CFfl2 
* CFA1 = JETCCMA AND (NCT PHESSA); * 
* OFB1 = JETCCMB AND (NCT PdESSb) ; * 
* CFC1 = JETCChC AND (NCT PRESSC); * 
* CE1 = .JETCCND AND (NCT PRESSr.);
 
* ** ****** ***** ***** *V
* *   f* 
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I LONT BAIL JETS CVtEIULLEN AS GCCD
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* JFAILA = (JEAILA Ch (CFA3 AD CFAA AND * 
* cFA1)) AND (?CT ONOVERbILZA);
* *
 
4 *
 
* JFAILB = (JFAILB CR (CFE3 AND CWE2 AND * 
*JFAILC = (*IILC Cv (C;C3 AND CFC2 AND
 
* GFCI)) AND (NOT ONOVERRIDE_L); *
 
* w * *JFAILC =(JFAILC Cii (CFC3 AND CEC AND* 
*cFDl) ) AND (NOT ONOVERR3IDEc)* 
2.2.5 	ONFAIL (see automatic flowchart)
 
ONFAIL detects failures of jets to shut off in response to off
 
commands, spurious RCS firings, and RCS fuel and oxidizer leaks within
 
the jets.
 
Upon initialization, ONFAIL sets the automatic manifold isolation
 
valve close commands equal to the good copies from STORE FDI INITDATA.
 
Each pass, ONFAIL checks leak detector outputs, combines them
 
with driver talkbacks, checks for failed on jets, and flags such jets
 
for rechecking.
 
To check leak detector output, ONFAIL'treats each output as a
 
string of 16 bits. It ANDs each output with a mask representing the
 
logical complement of a 310 F output (BIN '1111111111000000'). Since
 
the transition from 300F to 310F occurs in the bit strings as
 
BIN '0000000000111111' to BIN '0000000001000000', the result will be
 
BIN '0000000000000000' if the indicated temperature is below 31F,
 
the condition for a leak. If this occurs for either the fuel or oxi­
dizer 	injector temperature sensor, ONFAIL sets the software copy of
 
the driver talkback to on (or leaves it on if it is already so).
 
Having completed this, ONFAIL loads into the first slot of its push­
down 	list (NEWFAIL) those jets not commanded on, but whose driver
 
talkbacks are on and which have not been previously failed by ONFAIL,
 
by ANDing the driver talkbacks with the logical complement of the jet
 
commands ORed with the previous fail data. ONFAIL then adds to the
 
fail list, and flags for recheck, those jets which are in both slots
 
of the pushdown list. Finally, ONFAIL advances its pushdown list for
 
the next pass, by loading entries from the first slot into the second
 
slot.
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II 5$ II II II SI5 I' II Ii Ilii II $ 
It NE AIL: Io 
RCCEDUSE; 
IF IN ON AIL. = O.. . . . .. 
* * * MANCCMA = GOOD MANCOMA; * 
* MANCCMB = GOOD MANCOMB; * 
MANCCMC = GOOD MANCOMC; * 
*MANCCt D = GOOD ?IARCOAID;* 
* IIT-ONFAIL = OFF;
* * 4 *** ***** *4**** 
* 
C. S. DRAPER LABORATORY 
I. WORD A 
AUTOMATIC FLOWCHART OF PHOCEDURE ONFAIL JANUARY 21,1976. 22:40:31.56. 40 
* DO FOR I = I TO 8 BY 1; *----------* 
* IF ((FLEAK 
. 
AND MASkTHRESHOLD) = HEX0) * 
wc r B * 
* I:* * 
*--------------------
~THEN ~*1~ 
45L 
*DO FOR 1 9 TO lb BY 1; 
*$$********** * 
I O I = '7 O3 YI 
---------. 
IF ((Fu AK 
* IF ((OLEAK 
..... *. 
.' 
AND MASK_THRESHOLO) = HEX#0t) 
AND MASK_THRESHOLD) = HEO) 
.* 
* 
I* 
*flCF~~-----T--------
I:* * , TE 
46-----­
*** 
I** 
"-*---------------* 
R*((CIEAK AND MASK THRESHOLD) = HEXO) * 
*& THEN....*-***** 
46 
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I WOR L 
* n FOh 1 31 TO 44 BY 1; ----- * 
* IF ((FLEAK AND fASKTH;RLSHOLD) = EIEX'O') * 
* I.* * THEN *** 
I--------- * 47 
* OR ((ClEAK AND MASK_THRESHOLD) = HEXO') * 
OD 
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* PREVAIA); 
* * 
* EWFAII = DRIVERH AND NOT (JEICCCA OI * 
* PREV FAILB); * 
* V2AL);*
 
* NEIFAI = £RIVErB AND NOT (JETCCMBC R *
 
* REVBAlhE); 
* * 
* NCHECKA = EWFAILa AND OLECAILA; * 
* 4 
*ECHECKB = NEWFAILB AND OLD*AILI; 
* ECHECKC = NEWAIC AD OLDAILC; * 
* * 
* NECHECK = LEWAILD AND OLEAILC; * 
* * 
* EEHECC =FICONEWAI CHNEODEII;
JFAILAIA NWA OR OFCHECKAIA
 
* JFAILC = NEAFLOR DECHECK; 
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JFAlILD = JFAILD OR RYCHECKD; *
 
GLDFAILA = NEFAILA AhO (ECT DN_CVESiIDEA);
 
* CLDEAIIB = NEWFAILB AND (NCT ON CVERHICEB); *
 
* OLDEAILC = NEWFAILC AND (NOI ON_GVESEIDE_C); *
 
* CLDFAILD = NEhEAILD AND (NCI Ch OVERRIDE_D) ; 
0 
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44 
* * * * **EA* O dAWO£ 
* ZRIVEBA = tRIVERA OR BAEWORL ; * 
4 * I.6 
* RIVE E = EHIVLRB OR IAWCRE *45 
* 46 * 
* * 4* *4° 
* RIVELC =frSIVERC OR MAPWOGf ; 
*47*
 
4EH1V2Rl DRIVERD OR kMAEWOCn 
2.2.6 RECHECKONFAILS (see automatic flowchart)
 
RECHECK ONFAILS examines those jets which have been added by
 
ONFAIL to the.jet fail list on the previous major cycle, and closes
 
the manifold isolation vlaves for those jets which still indicate leaks,
 
or whose driver talkbacks remain on. The procedure then flags as
 
previously rechecked, those jets currently,flagged for rechecking,
 
by ORing PREVFAIL and RECHECK.
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RECHECKCNFAILS: 
DO FOR IEMPCRKRY L =1 TO 4; *--------
IF (NEWAILA AND RECHECKA AND MAP 
* L:* 
*~ ~**MANCCKA 
* NOT HEXIO' 
*THEN 
*-
* 
----------------
* 
. 
= MAPMANCOM 
T,* 
* 
* 
I I 
* 
IF (NEWFAILB AND RECHECKB AND NAP ) 
* ~L+4:* 
NOT = HEXO0' 
* 
*------------------* 
* 
* 
THEN 
. 
**************** 
* NANCOMB = MAPMANCOS : 
L:* 
* ******* * * ** **4 
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* 	 IF (NEWFAILC AND RECHECKC AND NAP ) * THEN ************************* 
* 	 L+8:* -------- - * 
* 	 * * MANCCMC MAPMANCOMC * 
NOT = HEX'O* * * L:* 
*IF (NSWFAZLD AND RECiiECKD AND NAP ) *THEN * * * * * * *PP' 
* 	 L~~+12:* *-----------------* 
* 	 * * MAVCOND MAP- MANCOD ;
4 	 NOT = HX'0 * * 14* * 
*PREY_ FAILA = -RVFAL Of *ERCA 
*RVFAL = PHEV-FAILA OR hECHECKA;*
 
I *******************.********************* 
*PREY FAItH = PREy FAILB 'OR MECHEKCB;* 
*PREV FAILD = PhEY FAILC OR VECHECKC;* 
2.2.7 MANIFOLDCHECK (see automatic flowchart)
 
MANIFOLD CHECK compares the manifold isolation valve OPEN talk­
backs with their values on the last pass through MANIFOLD CHECK. If a
 
manifold isolation valve OPEN talkback changes from OFF to ON, the
 
jets on that manifold not failed prior to valve closure are deleted
 
from the jet fail list, by ANDing JFAIL and the complement of
 
REINSTATE for this manifold.
 
If a manifold isolation valve OPEN talkback changes from ON to
 
OFF, MANIFOLD-CHECK does the following. First, a record of the jets
 
on the manifold which are not failed at the time of manifold closure
 
is made by ANDing the complement of the jet fail list with a map of
 
the jets on this manifold. Next, the map of the jets on this manifold
 
is ORed with the jet fail list to add those jets to the fail list.
 
Finally, the complement of the map of jets on this manifold is ANDed
 
with ON OVERRIDE A to prevent RCS FDI deleting those jets from the
 
fail list while the manifold isolation valve is closed.
 
MANIFOLD CHECK then ORs the OFF OVERRIDEs with the fail list to
 
implement the crew inhibit function. Finally, a copy of the current
 
manifold isolation valve OPEN talkbacks is stored for use on the next
 
pass.
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tll 19ltll s' tilllll1$ l5i 55 5 15591)9 l 
MANIFOLDCHECK: 
It 	 i 
"ROCELURE;
l4Is sisillti Ulls'I llII II 54 sI IsI 
* IF XOB (IVOA, OLLJVOA) NGT EIN(16) O- * 
THEN DCZ
 
I-* 
*DO FOR I I To 4; ------ * ­
* 	 IF IVOk ON *THEN 
MAPIVCA *------------------~ *PIA JAL N NPISAF 
* 	 A
 
* 	 * D* 
IPNCV;ID_N =5N(£	 ONOORID- ANDOA NOTV 

I** 
I 	 I~~~~~~~~~~~ELSF********** ** ********* _V A* 	 *. . .* - . - * 
* i 	 * ON VERIDL ON AND *ENTAF• 	 A = VRIDEA NOT 
*REINSTATEA =MAPA AN4DNOT JFAILA;*
**I ** 	 * 
I 	 ** ­ * 
S* 	 RAIA TE A N O FIA * 
* I:* 	 * 
**END; 	 * 
* **** * 
I 
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* ELSE DO; 
* IF XOR (IVCB, OLD IVCE) MCI = BIN(16) 10' 
* THEN DO; 
*DO FOR 1 1 TO 4; ------ * 	 * 
* 	IF IVOB =ON *THlEN **** **************** 
MAP IVCB * - + *.-

SI 	 * *• JFAILB = JFAILB AND NOT REINSTATEB * 
I* 	 * I *' 1:*' * 
IE-L~sE *****************************************
 
I~ 	 RIL = APB AND'R NSTATED]1 	 NOT JFATLB;* 
* JFAILB JFAILB OR MAPB 	 * 
* ON OVERRIDE B ONOVERRIDE B AND NOT * 
NAPBM ; 	 * 
* fli; 	 * 
* ELSE DO; * 
* IF XOR (IVGC, OLD_IVCC) NOT = EIN(16) 0 * 
* THEN DC; 	 * 
51 C. S. DRAPER LABORATORY AUTOMATIC FLOWCHART OF PROCEDURE MANIFOLDCHECK JANUARY 21'1976. 22:40:31.56. 
* DO FOR I 1 TO 4; * -- - --
IF IVOC ON *THEN *t***4**t*********t~* 
MAPIVOC *-------------­
* I * I * JFAIIC = JFAILC AND NOT PEINSTATEC * 
J* 
* FEINSTATEC = MAPC AND NOT 
I:* 
* JFAfC JFAILC OR MAPC* 
JFATLC; * 
IF 
DO;OO 
XO* (IVCE* OLDIVOL) NCI = IN(16) 101 
** 
*ELSE 
* I:'** 
SEND; 
DO OR* 1 TO 4; *----­
* 03 j 
*4 9 9 * 9**9* *99*9* * *4  *9  *9* **9* 
* END; 
* 
APIVOD 
49 
-- - ­ -----. . . . . * 
* 
I 
.JFAILD JFAILD AND NOT REIN*TAtED 
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~~~~~~~~~~~ELSE**4*4*4*****4*444*4*I 
REINSTATED = MAPD AND NOT JFAILD; 
*I-* 
JFAILD = JFAILD OR MAPD ; * 
*I-* 
* 	 ON OVERRIDE D = ON OVERRIDE k NOT *%ND 

MAPD 	 * 
* I:* 
END;
 
* 	 * 
• ENL; * 
END:4 
END;4 
= 

* 	 JFAILA JFAILA OR OFCVERhilDiA; * 
JFAILB = JFAILB CR OFF_ CVERIIDE ;4 
JFAILC = JFAILC C OF-_ CVZERIrZC; 
JFAILL = JEAlD OR CFF CVEEI(DED;
 
CL' IVOA = IlOA; *
 
* fLD_IVOE = I/VOB; * 
CL_IVOC = IVOC; * 
SCLL IVO = IHOD: 4 
2.2.8 FUELIMBALANCE (see automatic flowchart)
 
FUEL IMBALANCE receives fuel quantities and oxidizer quantities
 
in the RCS tanks in each of the three RCS modules. These quantities
 
are expressed as percent of tank capacity. The procedure compares
 
the quantities, and also compares their difference to a preset thresh­
old. If the magnitude of the difference between the percentages is
 
greater than 1.6, an imbalance flag is set. FUEL IMBALANCE then'de­
cides whether the remaining oxidizer in each module is less than
 
the fuel quantity remaining in that module. If so, it flags the
 
oxidizer as the lesser quantity, and provides it for display.- Other­
wise, it flags the fuel quantity and makes it similarly available.
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FUElIMEALANCE:
 
RCCEDURE; 
I t of tl ltit'ltllt llt I i 'I tof 
CHECKS RATIO OF FUEL QUANTITY T0 OXY QUANTITY IN EACH
 
OF THREE PAIRS CE IANXS AhD FLAGS IMBALANCE TC WARN CREW
 
o [FUELIMBALANCE FLAG] OFF;
 
'­
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* DO FOE I = 1 TO 3; * - Ip ABS(OXYQUANTITY - FUEL_ UANTITY ) > * 
* *.. THEN * 
* *---------------------­
* aMBALANCETHRESHOLD * * FUELIMBALANCE FLAG = ON. * 
* * * I:* * 
* IF OXY-QUANTI Y > FUEL QUANTITY * THEN ******************************** 
* I I *-----------* MINQUANTITY = FUEL QUANTITY * 
* * I * I I * 
******************* ********************************* J 
IELSE ********************************* 
4- * MIN_QUANTITY = OXYQUANTITY * 
* I I*
* ***,g*** *** ** * ** ******* * * ***** * 
2.2.9 Core Requirements and CPU Time
 
The timing and core requirements (Table 2) for RCS FDI are esti­
mates based on results of compilation by the HAL/S and HAL/F compilers
 
(HAL/S release 14.0 of 16 Dec. 75, HAL/F release 10.0 of 16 Dec. 75).
 
They are not to betaken as final values, as studies of code and timing
 
optimization are still in progress, and requirements levied on RCS FDI
 
are in a state of flux.
 
Table 2. Approximate RCS FDI CPU times and burden 

major cycle = 1.0 s).
 
Procedure Portion Case 
FDIIEXEC minor cycle 
major cycle, 
worst 
MONITORBTUMASK no-BTU MASKs 
on
 
worst 

STORE FDI INIT DATA all 

OVERRIDE UPDATE init 

all but init each pass 

OFFAIL init 

all but init each pass 

RECHECKONFAILS one fail, 

close mani­
fold
 
ONFAIL init 

all but init one leak 

MANIFOLD CHECK one change, 

longest path
 
through code
 
FUEL IMBALANCE worst 

Total worst case (no inits) 

Core requirements
 
Program 575 whole words
 
Data 285 whole words
 
(minor cycle = 0.04 s,
 
Time
 
(us) %CPU
 
22.8 0.057
 
66.1 0.165
 
103.0 0.258
 
296.9 0.742
 
81.4 0.0081
 
40.'6 0.0041
 
122.6 0.012
 
34.9 0.087
 
114.3 0.286
 
308.3 0.03083
 
26.2 0.00262
 
924.8 0.0925
 
350.1 0.876
 
151.2 0.01512
 
2.235
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SECTION 3
 
GLOSSARY
 
Table 3 describes all variables and constants used in RCS PDT.
 
The entries are listed alphabetically by computer name.
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Table 3. RCS FDI glossary. 
Computer Name 
Type/ 
Attribute Description Units 
Value 
Range Declared In Assigned In Referenced In 
ONOVERRIDEA 
ON OVERRIDE B 
ONOVERRIDE_C 
ONOVERRIDED 
B't(32) List of jets to be deleted from 
fail list by crew 
- TBD COMPOOL HDWRE/IOP ONFArL 
Ln 
OXY3UANTITY 
PRESSA 
PRESSB 
PRESSC 
PRESSD 
Array(3)/ 
Integer 
Bit(32) 
Oxidizer remaining in RCS tanks 
Packed jet chamber pressure 
sensor talkbacks 
percent 
-
0-109 
ON/OFF 
COMPOOL 
COMPOOL 
RCS-PVT 
EDWRE/IOP 
FUEL IMBALANCE 
OFFAIL 
PREVFAILA 
PREVFAILB 
PREVFAII.C 
PREV-FAILD 
Bit(32) Record of jets previously 
rechecked 
ON/OFF COMPOOL RECHECKONFAIL ONFAIL 
RECHECKA 
RECHECKB 
RECHECKC 
RECHECKD 
Bit(32) List of failed jets flagged for 
recheck 
ON/OFF COMPOOL ONFAIL RECHECKONFAILS 
REINSTATEA 
REINSTATEB 
REINSTATEC 
REINSTATED 
Array(4)/ 
Bit(32) 
List of jets on each manifold 
failed prior to isolation 
valve closure 
ON/OFF MANIFOLDCHECK MANIFOLD CHECK MANIFOLDCHECK 
Computer Name 

GOODJFAILA 

GOODJFAIIS 

GOOD_.JAILC
 
GOOD JFAILD
 
GOOD MANCOMA 

GOOD MANCOMB 
GOOD MANCOMC 

GOOD_MANCOMD 
GOODOFFOVERRIDEA 
GOODOFPFOVERRIDEB 

GOODOFFOVERRIDEC 
GOODOFFOVERRIDE_D 
Ln
 
GOOD ON OVERRIDE A 
GOOD ON OVERRIDEB 
GOODONOVERRIDE_C 
GOODONOVERRIDE_0 
Z 

IMBALANCETHRESHOLD 
INHIBIT A 

INHIBIT B 

INHIBIT C 
.ENHhI)T_
 
INnT OFFAIL 

Type/ 

Attribute 

Bxt(32) 

Bit(32) 

Bit(32) 
Bit(32) 
Integer 

Integer 
Bxt(32) 

Bit(l) 

Table 3. RCS FDI glossary (Cont.).
 
Value
 
Description Units Range Declared In 

Copies of RCS fail list stored ON/OFF COMPOOL 

for initialization 

Copies of manifold isolation 
valve automatic close commands 
stored for initialization 
ON/OFF COMPOOL 
Copies of off overrides 
for initialization 
Stored ON/OFF COMPOOL 
Copies of on overrides 
for initialization 
stored ON/OFF COMPOOL 
Counter 1, 
4 
2, 3, COMPOOL 
1/2 range of acceptable RCS 
tank fuel/oxidizer quantities 
TD FUEL-IMBALANCE 
Packed requests to inhibit use 
of certain RCS lets 
ON/OFF COMPOOL 
Initialization flag for OFFAIL ON/OFF COMPOOL 

Assigned In Referenced In
 
STOREFDIINIT_ OFFAIL
 
DATA 
STORE FDI INIT ONFAIL
 
DATA
 
STOREFD-IN'T OVERDIDtUPDATE 
DATA 
STORE FDI INT OVERRIDE UPDATE 
DATA 
Initialization FUEL IMBALANCE
 
(Mission Constant)
 
b&c SOP OVERRIDE-UPDATE 
MS&C, MONITOR OFFAIL
 
BTU MASK
 
Table 3. RCS FDI glossary (Cont). 
Computer Name 
Type/ 
Attribute Description Units 
Value 
Range Declared In Assigned In Referenced In 
INITONFAIL Bit(1) Initialization flag for ONFAIL - ON/OFF COMPOOL MS&C, MONITOR-
BTU_MASK 
ONFAIL 
INIT OVERRIDEUPDATE Bit(l) Initialization 
UPDATE 
flag for OVERRIDE - ON/OFF COMPOOL MS&C, MONITOR-
BTU-MASK 
ONFAIL 
IVOA 
IVOB 
IVOC 
IVOD 
Bit(16) Manifold isolation valve 
talkbacks 
OPEN - ON/OFF COMPOOL HDWRE/IOP MANIFOLD 
/ 
CHECK 
Ln 
-J 
JETCOMA 
JETCOMB 
JETCOMC 
JETCOMD 
Bit(32) RCS jet corrmands - ON/OFF COMPOOL JETSELECT ONFAIL, OFFAIL 
JFAILA 
JFAILB 
JFAILC 
JFAILD 
Bit(32) RCS fail list ON/OFF COMPOOL ONFAIL, OFFAIL, 
MANIFOLDCHECK, 
OVERRIDE UPDATE, 
MONITORBTUMASK 
JET SELECT, 
D&C SOP 
MAJORCYCLE Bit(l) Major cycle flag - ON/OFF COMPOOL FCOS FDI EXEC 
MANCOMA 
MANCOMB 
MANCOMC 
MANCOMD 
Bit(32) Manifold isolation valve 
matic close commands 
auto- - ON/OFF COMPOOL ONFAIL, MONITOR-
BTUMASK 
HDWRE/IOP 
MANUALOVERRIDEA 
MANUALOVERRIDEB 
MANUALOVERRIDE C 
MANUAL OVERRIDE D 
Bit(32) Request to reenable 
FDI on certain jets 
and inhibit ON/OFF COMPOOL D&C SOP OVERRIDE-UPDATE 
Computer Name 

MAP IVOA 
MAP IVOB 

MAP-IVOC 
MAPIVOD 
MAP MANCOMA 
MAP MANCOMB 

MAP _MACOIC 
MAP MANCOMD 
MAPA 

L1 MAPS 

MAPO 
MAPD 
MAPWORD 

MASK THRESHOLD 

MINSUANTITY 

MINOR-CYCLE 
NEWFAILA 

NEWFAILB 
NEWFAILC 
NEWFAILD 
Type/ 

Attribute 

Array(4)/ 
Integer 

Array(4)/ 

Integer 

Array(44)/ 

Bit(32) 

Array(44)/ 

Bit (32) 

Bit(16) 

Array(3)/ 

Integer 

mat(1) 

Bit(32) 

Table 3. RCS FD1 glossary (Cont).
 
Value 
Description Units Range Declared In 
Bit assignments of packed manifold - ON/OFF MANIFOLD-CHECK 
isolation valve talkback discretes 

Bit assignments of packed manifold ON/OF COMPOOL 
isolation valve automatic close 

commands 
Bit assignments of jet commands ON/OFF MANIFOLDCHECK 

by manifold 

Masks of driver talkbacks by jet - ON/OFF ONFAIL 
Internal mask for THRESHOLD - BIN(IO)'l ONFAIL 
temperature of fuel/oxidizer IIBIN(6) '0' 
Lesser of oxidizer/fuel quantity percent 0-109 COMPOOL 
in each RCS module 
Flag indicating minor cycle - ON/OFF COMPOOL 
First slot in OFAIL pushdown - ON/OFF ONFAIL 
list 
Assigned In Referenced In 
Initialization MANIFOLD-CHECK 
(Mission Constant)
 
Initialization MONITORBTU NASK, 
(Mission Constant) BBCHECKONFAILS
 
Initialization 

(Mission Constant)
 
Initialization 

(Mission Constant
 
Initialization 

(Mission Constant
 
FUELIMPALANCE 
FCOS 

ONFAIL 

MANIFOLD CHECK
 
ONFAIL
 
ONFAIL
 
D&C SOP
 
FDIEXEC
 
ONFAIL, RECHECK
 
ONFAILS 
Table 3. RCS FD1 glossary (Cont). 
P Computer Name 
ype% 
Attribute Description Units 
Value 
Range Declared In Assigned In Referenced In 
Vd 
OAL 
OFBl 
OFCI 
OFDi 
fit(32) First 
list 
slot In OFFAIL pushdown - ON/OFF OFFAIL OFFAIL OFPAIL 
- OFA2 
OFB2 
OFC2 
OFD2 
Bit(32) Second slot in OFFAIL pushdown 
list 
ON/OFF OFFAIL OFFAIL OFFArL 
OFA3 
OFR3 
OFC3 
OFD3 
Eit(32) Third slot in OFFAIL pushdown 
list 
ON/OFF OFFAIL OFFAIL OFFAIL 
OFFOVERRIDEA 
OFFOVERRIDEB 
OFF OVERRIDSC 
OFFOVER0RIDEU 
Bit(321 List of jets to be added to 
fail list by eew request 
ON/OFF OVERRIDE UPDATE OVERRIDE UPDATE STOREFDIINIT_ 
DATA 
OVERRIDEUPDATE 
MANIFOLDCHECK 
OLDIVOA 
OLDIVOD 
OLD-IVOC 
OLDIVOD 
Bit (16) List of manifold asolation 
talkbacks from prior pass 
valve ON/OFF MANIFOLDCHECK MANIFOLD CHECK MANIFOLD CHECK 
OLDFAILA 
OLDFAILB 
OLDFAILC 
OLDFAILD 
Bit(3 2 ) Second slot in ONFAIL pushdown 
list 
ON/OFF ONFAIL ONFAIL ONFAIL 
OLEAK Array(44)/ 
Bit(16) 
Output of jet oxidizer injector 
temperature sensors 
0 
F TBD CONPOOL HDNRE/LOP ONFAIL 
Table 3. RCS FDI glossary (Cont.). 
Computer Name. 
Type/ 
Attribute Description units 
Value 
Range Declared In Assigned In Referenced In 
AUTOVERRIDEA 
AOT OVERRIDE-B 
AUTOVERRIDE_C 
AUTOVERRIDED 
Bit(32) Packed requests to reenable and 
continue FDI on certain jets 
- ON/OFF COMPOOL D&C SOP OVERRIDE-UPDATE 
BTUFA0i02 
BTUFA0110 
BTUFA03_02 
BTUFA0310 
BTOJFF0105 
BTUFF0113 
BTU-FF02-05 
BTU-FF02_13 
Bit(l) Flags indicating MDMdata path 
failures 
- ON/OFF COMPOOL FCOS MONITORBTUMASK 
o CALLINIT Bit(l) Internal flag denoting MDM 
failure has occurred 
ON/OFF MONITORBTUMASK MONITORBTMASK MONITORBTUMASK 
CHANGEOVERRIDESTATUS Bit(l) Flag indicating 
OVERRIDE_UPDATE 
a crew entry to ON/OFF COMPOOL D&C SOP OVERRIDEUPDATE 
DRIVERA 
DRIVERB 
DRIVERC 
DRIVERD 
Bit(32) Packed )et driver talkbacks ON/OFF COMPOOL HDWRE/I0P ONFAIL 
FLEAK Array (44)/ 
Bit(16) 
Output of jet fuel injector 
temperature sensors 
0 F TD COMPOOL HDWRE/IOP ONFAIL 
FUELIMALANCE-FLAG Array(3)/ 
Bit(1) 
Flags indicating fuel imbalances 
in RCS tanks 
ON/OFF COMPOOL FUEL IMBALANCE DEC SOP 
FUELJUANTITY Array(3)/ 
Integer 
Fuel remaining in RCS'tanks percent 0-109 COMPOOL RCS-PVT FUELIMBALANCE 
APPENDIX A
 
FORMAT OF FDT INPUT-OUTPUT DISCRETES
 
Certain of the,input discretes and output discretes are packed
 
for FDI procesging in groups of four 32-bit strings, designated by the
 
letter A, B, C, or D terminating the name (e.g., JETCOMA, JETCOMB,
 
JETCOMC, JETCOMD). Those discretes which are so arranged include the
 
following: 
(1) Manifold isolation valve close commands 
(2) Manifold isolation valve open talkbacks 
(3) Lists of bit assignments 
(4) Lists of manual override requests 
(5) Lists of inhibit requests 
(6) Jet commands 
(7) Jet driver talkbacks 
(8) Jet chamber pressure sensor talkbacks 
(9) Jet fail list 
(10), Jet reenable requests 
(11) Previous fail flags 
(12) Recheck flags 
(13) Lists of jets failed prior to manifold isolation valve 
closure 
The reason for so packing these discretes involves consideration
 
of storage access and CPU time burdens.
 
One of the desirable'properties of:any flight code dealing with
 
discretes generated in hardware is that minimal repacking of these
 
discretes be performed. To realize this, the code should operate on
 
strings of bits channelized as they are in the MDM.
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It was found that this data would be in eight strings of 16 bits
 
(one AP101 half word). Thus, an operation on all the jet commands, for
 
instance, would be performed as eight half-word instructions. Since
 
many such operations are performed, and since the difference in timing
 
between a half-word instruction and whole-word instruction was small
 
or zero, these eight half words were concatenated into four whole
 
words and then processed. The tradeoff is the time required to .per­
form four concatenations, against performing each operation on twice
 
as many bit strings. Currently, the design favors concatenation,
 
hence the representation of each set of discretes in four whole words.
 
These four whole words could be stored as an array, or stored in
 
four independent locations as currently done., There is no difference
 
in storage requirements. However, there is a tradeoff between writing
 
code for the strings as DO loops on array members, and replicated code
 
on four independent addresses. Clearly, less code is required for the
 
DO loop, but the current implementation of array addressing makes this
 
time-inefficient for small arrays. Thus, while there is a greater core
 
penalty for the four replications of each instruction, there is a sig­
nificant saving in execution time. Studies into this tradeoff are
 
currently underway, and should be reflected in subsequent-releases
 
of this document.
 
The MDM channelization of these discretes may be found in either
 
Reference 1 or Reference 2. In general, the assignments by jet for the
 
four words obtained by concatenation are:
 
BIT A B C D BIT A B C D
 
0 112 122 211 231 16 132 144 223 243
 
1 113 123 213 233 17, 134 146 225 245
 
2 115 125 215 236 18 135 157 226 246
 
3 116 126 311 331 19 146 158 324 344
 
4 314 334 20 325 345
 
5 315 336 21 326 346
 
6 22 357 357
 
7 23 358 358
 
8 2A 
9 25
 
10 26
 
11 27
 
12 28
 
13 29
 
14 30
 
15 31
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APPENDIX B
 
FORMAT OF LEAK DETECTOR OUTPUTS
 
Leak detection in the RCS jets is accomplished by measuring the
 
temperature at the fuel and oxidizer injector of each jet and comparing
 
them with a threshold temperature. As leaking RCS fuel and oxidizer
 
would very quickly cool the injectors, a leak is indicated by the sen­
sor output being below the threshold temperature. This data comes
 
through the MDM as 9 bits of fixed-point data, padded to a 16-bit integer
 
in the GPC registers.
 
While the HAL compiler has means of comparing the size of two
 
numbers, it was believed quicker to mask the output with a threshold,
 
and test the result as zero or nonzero.
 
This implies the format of these sensor outputs must be such that
 
they can be treated as bit strings, and particularly can be operated
 
upon by the logical AND. There is no conversion from integer format
 
to bit string, so by assuming the data enters the GPL as integer, the
 
is a great saving in code.
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